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An Optimist Looks at the Law of War
in the Twenty..First Century

Howard Levie

T

HE TITLE OF THIS ARTICLE IS REALLY A MISNOMER, as the author
is anything but optimistic that all, or even the majority, of the changes
that he considers to be essential for a law,abiding world will become a part of
the international law of war during the twenty,first century.l For that reason,
the discussion which follows is not with respect to what the author anticipates
will occur, but what he would like to see occur in order to make a better
world-only rarely what he actually expects to take place.2
The twentieth century saw tremendous progress in the international effort
to make war less horrendous.3 Nevertheless, a number of areas remain that still
require enforceable international legislation, at least some of which, one hopes,
will be remedied in the forthcoming millennium. If the twenty,first century
produces only a small percentage of the output of the twentieth century, the
world will be a better place in which to live.
United Nations Armed Forces
When the United Nations was brought to life in San Francisco in May 1945,
Articles 42 to 49 of the Charter adopted at that time provided for the method
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by which actions were to be taken by that organization, and the nature thereof,
in order to maintain or restore international peace. The attempt of the Security
Council to terminate hostilities in Korea by resolutions was a complete failure,
as was its military intervention. At one time, it was proposed to create
worldwide United Nations military forces, forces which would be large enough
and sufficiently well trained and equipped to intervene and bring an end to any
hostilities between nations. This proposal failed of fruition because of the
insistence of the Soviet Union that such a force be commanded by a troika,
three commanders who had to agree before any action could be taken by the
United Nations Armed Force. Obviously, military hostilities cannot be
conducted on such a basis, and the Military Staff Committee provided for in
Article 47 of the Charter became a lifeless organ, which meets but does not act.
The basic proposal was certainly an unusual one, one which many experts
believe to be impossible of creation and useless if created. Personnel would be
recruited from all over the world, stationed and trained in various strategic
locations, equipped to move quickly and fight wherever required to quell local
conflagrations, and nonpartisan except insofar as it might be necessary to
overcome an aggressor. The existence of such a world armed force would have
prevented, or quickly brought to an end, many of the dozens of local wars
which have occurred during the lifetime of the United Nations. Korea could
have been brought to an end far more quickly and effectively had a well, trained
international armed force been in existence in 1950-and had the People's
Republic of China accepted the fact that it could not participate in hostilities
against the United Nations Armed Force, a force which would undoubtedly
have included hundreds ofits citizens. The Gulf crisis would have been brought
to an end in weeks instead of months had such an armed force already been in
existence in August 1990.
Unfortunately, makeshift "United Nations Peacekeeping Forces" have
proved of dubious value and are dependent on member nations volunteering
parts of their armed forces, always a matter of delay during which the fighting
gains momentum. Moreover, "peacekeeping forces" always have a limited
mission-a mission frequently restricted to the relief or protection of the
civilian population. What is needed is at least a try,out of the system originally
contemplated, i.e., United Nations Armed Forces, the members of which are
citizens of the world who remain ready to put out conflagrations between
countries before they can serve the purpose of the aggressor. 4 However, a
method would have to be devised by which this Armed Force could not be
prevented from performing the function for which it was created by the veto of
one member of the Security Council of the United Nations. While the entire
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proposal envisaged is certainly utopian in nature, the world has much to gain
and little (apart from money) to lose if it were at least to experiment with this
proposal.
There is no question but that maintaining such a permanent Armed Force
would be a costly project-but it would be far less costly than the endless
internecine conflicts with which the world community of nations is presently
plagued; its cost would probably not far exceed the cost of the frequently
ineffective "peacekeeping forces."

Instruction in the Law of War
Unfortunately, many violations of the international law of war are
committed because the perpetrator is unaware of the fact that the action which
he is taking is a violation of the law of war. Many armies provide no training
whatsoever in the law of war. This is frequently evidenced by the wanton
killing of captured military personnel and civilians, the destruction or misuse of
protected buildings such as hospitals and churches, the looting of civilian
homes and shops, etc.s For their own protection, members of armed forces
should be given instruction on the law of war to prevent them from unwittingly
committing acts which may subsequently result in their being tried for war
crimes. Few countries put a rifle in a man's hands and say, "Now you are a
soldierl" There is always, as a minimum, some basic instruction in the conduct
of warfare, and instruction in the law of war does not require more than a few
hours of time during that basic training. Seldom do individuals knowingly and
wilfully commit violations of the law of war unless it is the practice of their
nation and their armed force. If every armed force gave such instruction, the
number of violations of the law of war would be materially decreased and the
need for trials for war crimes would be proportionately reduced.

International Criminal Court
The war crimes trials conducted by the Supreme Court of Leipzig after
World \Y./ ar I demonstrated that a defeated nation could not be effective in
trying members of its own armed forces for war crimes alleged to have been
committed by them against enemy military personnel, civilians, and property
during the course of the conflict. While the great majority of war crimes cases
tried after World War II were fair, they were nevertheless subject to the claim
that it was a case of the "victor trying the vanquished."
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For years the international community of nations has been endeavoring to
reach agreement on the creation of an international criminal court. The
League of Nations created one, but it failed to receive the support of individual
nations. The International Law Commission was long ago directed to draft a
statute for such an organization and has finally prepared one, which is presently
under discussion; a Diplomatic Conference seized with the matter is scheduled
to convene in Rome in 1998. So there are grounds for anticipating that the
establishment of such a court, with jurisdiction over war crimes, will become a
century. Grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva
reality during the
Conventions and of the 1977 Additional Protocol I are among the more
important offenses listed. This would mean that a nation at war could bring
charges before the International Criminal Court against enemy violators of the
law of war during the course of the conflict without fear of reprisals, as
retaliation would be limited to the bringing of charges before the Court against
individuals by the other side. This would not be a true reprisal, because the
right to bring such charges would have existed in any case.
It may well be assumed that the manner in which the International
Tribunals established by the United Nations Security Council for the trials of
violations of the law of war committed in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda
perform their functions will have a major influence on whether the
international community does eventually decide to establish an international
criminal court. While the activities to date of those Tribunals has been far from
exemplary, the present author believes that such a court will be established in
the coming years. Whether States will become Parties to a convention creating
it is another matter. Certainly, it can be assumed that outlaw States such as
Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea will not. There is also considerable doubt
that such States as the People's Republic of China and the other remaining
communist countries, with their closed societies, will become Parties to a
convention establishing an International Criminal Court that would have
jurisdiction over their nationals of all ranks for violations of specified
international laws. There is even considerable doubt that the United States
Senate would give its advice and consent to the ratification of a Convention
establishing such a court.6

Protecting Powers
Unfortunately, international wars are inevitable no matter what actions are
taken to prevent them, and even if a United Nations Armed Force is
established, rules must be adopted and a method devised which will compel the
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participants to comply with those rules until the hostilities are brought to an
end. While there were Protecting Powers acting on both sides during the
Franco,Prussian War (1870-1871), for some unknown reason there were no
provisions for Protecting Powers in either the 1899 or the 1907 Regulations
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, even though Chapter II of
both contained provisions for the humane treatment of prisoners of war.
During World War I a number of agreements, both bilateral and multilateral,
were entered into which provided additional protection for prisoners of war,
and Protecting Powers were designated and functioned to ensure compliance
with the regulations for the treatment of prisoners of war.
The 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War attempted to remedy this defect by the addition of specific provisions
calling for the designation of Protecting Powers. Article 86 of the Convention
stated:
The High Contracting Parties recognize that a guarantee of the regular
application of the present Convention will be found in the possibility of
collaboration .between the protecting Powers charged with safeguarding the
interests of belligerents; in this respect, the protecting Powers may, besides their
diplomatic personnel, appoint delegates from among their own nationals or the
nationals of other neutral Powers. The appointment of these delegates must be
subject to the approval of the belligerent with whom they exercise their mission.
Representatives of the protecting Power or its accepted delegates shall be
permitted to go to any place, without exception, where prisoners of war are
interned. They shall have access to all places occupied by prisoners and may
interview them, as a general rule without witnesses, personally or through
interpreters.
Belligerents shall so far as possible facilitate the task of representative or
accepted delegates of the protecting Power. The military authorities shall be
informed of their visit.
Belligerents may come to an agreement to allow persons of the same
nationality as the prisoners to be permitted to take part in inspection tripS. 7

During World War II, almost every nation at war had Protecting Powers
with every enemy country.s Nazi Germany complied with the Convention and
permitted the Protecting Powers and the International Committee of the Red
Cross to function in the expected manner in its camps for British and American
prisoners of war, with the result that the death rate among such prisoners of war
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was exceedingly low. The reverse was also true, with Protecting Powers for
Germany and the International Committee of the Red Cross functioning in the
prisoner,of,war camps for German prisoners of war maintained by the British
and the Americans. It was only in the prisoner,of,war camps operated by the
Soviet Union and the Japanese (and by the Germans for Soviet prisoners of
war) that limitations on the operations of the Protecting Powers and the
International Committee of the Red Cross resulted in a high mortality rate
among prisoners,of,war. There were a number of war crimes trials based on
violations of the law of war relating to the treatment of prisoners of war where
international supervision was denied.
Articles 8 and 9 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War are very similar to, but more extensive than, the provisions
of their predecessor. They provide:
Art. 8. The present Convention shall be applied with the cooperation and
under the scrutiny of the Protecting Powers whose duty it is to safeguard the
interests of the Parties to the conflict. For this purpose, the Protecting Powers
may appoint, apart from their diplomatic or consular staff, delegates from
among their own nationals or the nationals of other neutral Powers. The said
delegates shall be subject to the approval of the Power with which they are to
carry out their duties.
The Parties to the conflict shall facilitate to the greatest extent possible the
task of the representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers.
The representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers shall not in any case
exceed their mission under the present Convention. They shall, in particular,
take account of the imperative necessities of security of the State wherein they
carry out their duties.
Art. 9. The provisions of the Present Convention constitute no obstacle to the
humanitarian activities which the International Committee of the Red Cross or
any otherimpartial humanitarian organization may, subject to the consent of the
Parties to the conflict concerned, undertake for the protection of prisoners of war
and for their relieC

During the hostilities in Korea, not only were there no Protecting Powers,
but the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists refused to allow the
delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross to have access to
their prisoner,of,war camps, thus denying any third,party supervision. tO As a
result, the death rate among prisoners of war was even greater than it had been
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among prisoner of war held by the Japanese during World War II. The situation
was identical in Vietnam. In both instances, the International Committee of
the Red Cross was permitted to perform its mission only on the noncommunist
sideY In the hundred or more international conflicts which have occurred
since the end of World War II, the only such conflict in which it might be
considered that Protecting Powers and the International Committee of the
Red Cross were permitted to perform their stated functions was in the
Falklands War (1982) between Argentina and Great Britain.
When the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(protocol 1) 12 was being drafted, it was hoped that this situation with respect to
Protecting Powers could be remedied by provisions which would ensure the
presence of a Protecting Power, or a substitute, in every conflict. Unfortunately, as
subsequent events have demonstrated, such an end has not been achieved.
Article 5 (2) of the Protocol read:; as follows:
From the beginning of a situation referred to in Article 1, each Party to the
conflict shall without delay, designate a Protecting Power for the purpose of
applying the Conventions and the present Protocol and shall, likewise without
delay and for the same purpose, permit the activities of a Protecting Power which
has been accepted by it as such after designation by the adverse Party.

Although the paragraph twice uses the imperative, it has proved
meaningless. The next paragraph (3) of the article appears to anticipate the
failure of States to comply with the provision and attempts to provide an
alternative. It states:
If a Protecting Power has not been designated or accepted from the beginning of
a situation referred to in Article 1, the International Committee of the Red
Cross, without prejudice to the right of any other impartial humanitarian
organization to do likewise, shall offer its good offices to the Parties to the
conflict with a view to the designation without delay of a Protecting Power to
which the Parties to the conflict consent. For that purpose it may, inter alia, ask
each Party to proVide it with a list of at least five States which that Party
considers acceptable to act as Protecting Power on its behalf in relation to an
adverse Party, and ask each adverse Party to provide a list of at least five States
which it would accept as the Protecting Power of the first Party; these lists shall
be communicated to the Committee within two weeks after the receipt of the
request; it shall compare them and seek the agreement of any proposed State
named on both of them.
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Twenty years and dozens of conflicts later, this system, which just might
possibly accomplish its purpose in some cases, has never been tried! 13
The fourth paragraph of Article 5 provides that, lacking Protecting Powers,
"the Parties to the conflict shall accept without delay an offer which may be
made by the International Committee of the Red Cross or by any other
organization which offers all guarantees of impartiality and efficacy." Again we
have the imperative-and again we know (and the drafters must have known!)
that there are a number of countries that will not permit the International
Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial organization to function on
their territory. This means that there will be no assurance that prisoners of war
are receiving humane treatment, and where there is no such assurance one can
be certain that they are not receiving such treatment!
There are two alternative solutions which might have been adopted. One
would have been to provide for the naming of Protecting Powers by the
Security Council of the United Nations (assuming that none of them are
Parties to the conflict and perhaps even then!). Inasmuch as both communists
and noncommunists are represented on that body, with both sides having a
veto power, it should be possible for them eventually to arrive at an agreement
on a State, or States, acceptable to both sides. 14 Such a procedure would ensure
the presence of a Protecting Power, an agency the mere presence of which
ensures more humane treatment for prisoners of war.
Another, and more workable, solution was proposed many years ago at the
1949 Diplomatic Conference by the French delegation. It called for the
establishment of a permanent "High International Committee for the
Protection of Humanity" which could act as a Protecting Power for both sides.
It was contemplated that the persons selected for membership in this
organization would be of such high character that no country would have a
basis for denying them the right to perform the functions of a Protecting Power
should the occasion arise. It was included as a proposal in a resolution adopted
by the Conference, but when the French assessed the prospects for its
adoption, it received little or no support. 15 This is the best solution to an
otherwise insoluble problem.

Nuclear Weapons
Instead of pecking away at the possession of nuclear weapons by reducing
the numbers allowed, numbers that even at their reduced levels could account
for the deaths of millions of persons and the devastation of thousands of square
miles ofland, all nations, particularly those which presently possess strategic or
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tactical nuclear weapons, should agree to their destruction, and steps should be
taken by the United Nations to ensure that the world remains nuclear,free.
This can only be accomplished by agreements prohibiting the development,
production, and stockpiling of all nuclear weapons; calling for the destruction
of all existing such weapons; and providing for unlimited and unannounced
verification examinations, conducted by a permanent organization of trained
personnel authorized to go any place in any country without advance warning
to ensure that nuclear weapons are not secretly possessed or being produced. 16
This would also require a derogation of sovereignty, as it would be absolutely
essential that the unlimited and unannounced verification examinations be
conducted in all countries, including (perhaps particularly) those which have
not agreed to be bound by the act establishing the procedure.
One must truly be an optimist to believe that obtaining such a worldwide
agreement is possible. However, as the understanding of what nuclear warfare
entails grows, it can be foreseen that even in countries such as Iraq, Iran,
Communist China, and North Korea, to name but a few of those most likely to
disregard their international commitments, the populations will eventually
demand an end to this weapon which, if not made nonexistent, will one day
make Earth uninhabitable. This would be particularly true in time of war, as a
nation envisioning defeat would be likely to attempt to avoid that event
through the use of nuclear weapons against an enemy that it knows will not be
able to retaliate in kind. Moreover, in order to discourage other nations from
following a similar road, it will be necessary to impose some type of punishment
on the nation or nations found to have violated the prohibitions. Trade
sanctions hurt the population more than they hurt the miscreant government.
In contrast, limitations on the size of the armed forces and reduction in the
number and nature of standard weapons allowed to be imported and possessed
might be such a punishment, one which would not hurt, and might even help,
the ordinary, innocent citizen.
Bacteriological And Chemical Weapons
Although the twentieth century saw the drafting of both the Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction,17
and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction,18 there are
unfortunately nations which, even if they become Parties to these
Conventions, will violate them by subterfuge and develop and produce such
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weapons. Therefore, the United Nations organization of trained inspectors
referred to above with respect to nuclear weapons must also have the authority
to search for bacteriological and chemical weapons and ensure their
destruction when found. And once again, in order to discourage other nations
from following a similar road, it will be necessary to impose some type of
punishment on the nation or nations found to have violated the prohibitions.
Antipersonnel Landmines
It has been authoritatively estimated that there are a hundred million
landmines buried all over the world, some of which date back to World War II,
mines which cause half a dozen civilian casualties daily. Although Protocol II of
the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restriction on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons 19 placed various restrictions on the use of
antipersonnel landmines, they were considered inadequate. In May 1996 a
much more complete Protocol was drafted with provisions that, minimally,
or
zOThese
require landmines to be capable of
provisions are necessary and helpful, but what is also needed is the creation and
funding of an organization tasked with locating and destroying the
antipersonnel mines which now lie buried throughout the world. This is being
done, but at a snail's pace; meanwhile, casualties continue to occur.
There is a strong movement for the prohibition of alliandmines. Such a
movement will likely fail, because of the value of landmines for defensive
purposes, their original use. Perhaps an acceptable compromise would be to
allow only landmines which are triggered by a weight of several tons. This
would permit their use for defensive purposes, while eliminating the presently
existing danger to the innocent civilian.
Laser Weapons
The laser is a new weapon which has not yet been used in combat but that
exists and is available for use. Almost one hundred years ago, the nations
agreed to a ban on expanding bullets, because they caused unnecessary
suffering. A normal bullet would incapacitate the individual, all that was
required to remove him from participation in the battle; the expanding bullet
would tear his flesh and body apart, frequently causing tremendous suffering
and eventually death. 21 The laser functions in a similar fashion, as it may cause
irreversible blindness. Protocol IV to the Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
320

Howard Levie
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects22 is a first
step in limiting the use of the laser as a weapon. However, it is only a small step
in that direction. There is much need for a convention completely banning the
use oflasers in warfare.

§ § §
Of course, the true optimist would look forward to the complete acceptance
of the
Agreement, the 1928 Pact of Paris by which nations
condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and
renounced it as an instrument of national policy. Human nature being what it
is, the present author is not sufficiently optimistic to consider such a solution of
the problem of war even remotely possible. He looks only for the adoption of all
or some of the matters discussed above.

Notes
1. It will be noted that throughout this article the author uses the term "law of war" rather
than the term "international humanitarian law." The latter was invented by the International
Committee of the Red Cross in order to avoid the use of the nasty word "war."
2. That internal wars in which practically no rules are followed will continue to occur ad
infinitum appears inevitable. There will always be dissatisfied members of a population. and there
will always be individuals who are able to become the leaders of groups of such people and who
believe that they can reach their objective of superceding the existing government by the use of
force and terrorism. Such individuals and such groups are not concerned with humanitarian
rules governing the conduct of hostilities-they are concerned only with attaining their
objectives. Some will engage in acts of terrorism. knowing that such acts will rarely assist them in
attaining their objective. simply out of the need to give vent to their antagonism against their
rulers.
3. Some of these international agreements were drafted as disarmament tteaties. Yet if. for
example. the international community oudaws bacteriological or chemical weapons. then it may
draft the convention as a disarmament document. but the effect on the conduct of war is
obvious.
4. The major problem would be the selection of a language for general use and teaching all
of the members of the United Nations Armed Force. It should be noted that in modem
international law six languages (English. French. Russian. Chinese. Spanish. and Arabic) are
considered equally authentic.
5. A good example of this lack of compliance with the law of war can be found in the
activities of the Zairian army. which commited many of these offenses each time it was forced to
retreat by the rebel forces. In the rebel forces. strange to relate. the members appeared to have
more discipline than those of the regular army. Zaire is today known as Congo.
6. A lengthy. and somewhat pessimistic. discussion of the position of the United States will
be found in the BoSTON GLOBE. Aug. 17. 1997. at 1.
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7. 47 Stat. 2021, 2060; 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1776-1949, at 932,957 (Bevans ed., 1969); 118 L.N.T.S. 343, 393,27 AM. J.
INT'L L. (Supp.) 59, 84 (1933).
8. Because of the large number of belligerents and the few nations competent to act as
Protecting Powers, the functions were performed almost exclusively by Switzerland, Sweden,
and Spain. While this put a heavy manpower demand on these countries, especially SWitzerland,
which at one time was acting as the Protecting Power for thirty-five belUgerents, they all
succeeded in accomplishing their missions in an able manner.
9. (1949), Arts. 8-9,6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364,75 U.N.T.S. 135.
10. Although North Korea had not then as yet adhered to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, it
had notified the Secretary-General of the United Nations by telegram on 12 July 1950 that it was
"strictly abiding by principles of Geneva Conventions in respect to Prisoners of War. " 1 ICRC,
CONFLIT DE COREE: RECUEIL DE DOCUMENTS 16 (1952).
11. In every conflict in which a communist country is involved, no other communist country
would be asked to or would act as the Protecting Power for the nation in conflict with the
communist country, and no noncommunist country would be allowed so to act. Hence, in
conflicts in which communist countries are involved, there are never Protecting Powers and the
International Committee of the Red Cross is permitted to function only on the noncommunist
side. To the communists every noncommunist is a spy!
The ICRC made over 150 inspections of United Nations Command prisoner-of-war
installations and hospitals during the hostilities in Korea and found only minor deficiencies,
which were immediately corrected. Nonetheless, after the Armistice the Red Cross Society of
China (which, unlike the Red Cross societies in other countries, is not a private organization but
an arm of the government) published two voluminous reports charging the United Nations
Command with numerous atrocities against Chinese prisoners ofwar. (perhaps this was done on
the theory that the best defense is a good offense!) Some idea of the validity of these documents
may be obtained from the fact that one foreword starts with the statement, "On June 25, 1950,
the U.S. government launched an aggressive war against the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea."
12. 16 I.L.M. 1392 (1977); 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 457 (1978); INT'L REv. RED CROSS,
Aug-Sept. 1977, at3.
13. Had the hostilities in Korea resumed in the early Eighties (as seemed possible) and had
North Korea complied with this provision of the Protocol (which would be unlikely), one could
be sure that North Korea would have named its five choices from among the People's Republic of
China, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and perhaps Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, or
Cuba; certainly, none of those countries would have been on the list submitted by South Korea
or the United Nations Command.
14. In the case of Korea, India, (which had introduced the Resolution establishing the
Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission), was viewed by both sides as an acceptable neutral to
act as the umpire between the two countries named by the United Nations Command
(Switzerland and Sweden) and the two named by the North Koreans and the Chinese
Communists (Czechoslovakia and Poland).
A variation to this proposal would authorize the General Assembly of the United Nations to
name the Protecting Powers. Inasmuch as there would then be no veto power, this is less likely of
acceptance by the remaining communist countries, particularly the People's Republic of China.
15. 2 ICRC, CONFERENCE OF GoVERNMENT EXPERTS 21 (1971).
16. Compliance with such a procedure would unquestionably be met with the claim of
violation of sovereignty. It cannot be a violation of sovereignty if the State has consented.
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Although it is a Party to the appropriate Convention, North Korea long refused permission for
the United Nations inspection team to investigate its main nuclear plant. When it finally did so,
after many months of delay, the plant was found to be in compliance with
requirements-probably because during the long interim the North Koreans had moved
everything violative of the Convention to another, unspecified, site. It is this type of subterfuge
that it will be necessary to prevent by unscheduled inspections.
17. 26 U.S.T. 583 (1975), T.I.A.S. No. 8062, 1015 U.N.T.S. 164 (1976), 11 I.L.M.309
(1972) .
18. The United States Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of this
Convention on 24 April 1997. The Convention entered into force on 29 April 1997 with some
seventy-five States Parties. Not unexpectedly, none of the "outlaw States" have ratified or
acceded to either the Bacteriological or the Chemical convention.
19. 19 I.L.M. 1523 (1980); 21 INT'L REV. RED CRoss 19 (1981).
20. 35 I.L.M. 1206 (1996). An unusual feature of this amended Protocol is that its Article
14 (2) requires each Party "to ensure the impOSition of penal sanctions against persons who, in
relation to an armed conflict and contrary to the provisions of this Protocol, wilfully kill or cause
serious injury to civilians and to bring such persons to justice." In December 1997 anti-personnel
mines were barred completely, by the Ottawa Treaty on Antipersonnel Mines. The U.S. is not a
party to this convention.
21. Actually, an army does more damage when it wounds than when it kills, because the
dead body can be quickly disposed of while the wounded combatant may require the services of
several individuals to care for him, individuals who might otherwise be carrying a rifle or
manning a machine gun.
22. 35 I.L.M. 1218.
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